Discussion Papers 2001.
Role of the Regions in the Enlarging European Union 194-213. p.
Role of the Regions in the Enlarging European Union
Edited by Zoltan Gal, Pecs, Centre for Regional Studies, 2001
RETHINKING REGIONAL
GOVERNANCE AND PLANNING
Henk Voogd
Introduction
Regional planning has not been the most popular branch of planning (Wannop,
1995). Several authors (Classon, 1974; Martins, 1986) have argued that the
acceptance and success of regional planning strongly depend on the adminis-
trative strength of the authority that is responsible for this task. If this authority
is weak or absent, regional planning was often seen by local authorities as an
obscure ritual or administrative luxury (Self, 1980).
In the past regional planning was often primarily seen as a governmental ac-
tivity aimed at the production and review of some kind of a 'regional plan'.
However, planning theory has already taught us for many years that planning
involves more than just that (Healey, 1997). Modern regional planning is much
more than the application of regional development theories, such as developed
in traditional economics (Hilhorst, 1967, 1971). It is not only an intellectual
process, but also a social, political as well as organisational process. Control of
urban sprawl and mobility is impossible without regional co-ordination involv-
ing multiple local authorities and relevant stakeholders. Environmental pollu-
tion doesn't respect local boundaries either and likewise other public affairs can
often be best dealt with on a regional level such as, for instance, waste and wa-
ter management. Internationalisation and globalisation are tendencies that also
support a stronger regional representation in order to remain visible in the
European and worldwide competition. These and other phenomenon have im-
plications and certainly encourage a regional approach, which includes not only
government but non-governmental actors too.
John Glasson (1974) has made many years ago a valuable conceptual dis-
tinction between inter-regional planning and intra-regional planning. Inter-re-
gional planning is planning between regions. Its main aim is derived from so-
cial welfare since it seeks to change the economic inequality of regions. It is
also denoted as 'regional development', which has received a lot of attention in
literature (Cappelin—Batey, 1993; Molle—Cappelin, 1988; Hilpert, 1991; Hil-
Henk Voogd : Rethinking Regional Governance and Planning. In: Role of the Regions
in the Enlarging European Union. Pécs, Centre for Regional Studies, 2001. 194-213. p.
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195
horst, 1967, 1971). However, most of these studies are not dealing with plan-
ning itself, but with empirical characteristics of regional-economic develop-
ment and/or ex post evaluation of economic policy measures. Intra-regional
planning is planning within a region, but at a higher level than local authorities.
The primary aim of intra-regional planning is to achieve a satisfactory relation-
ship between people, jobs, and the environment within a region. Inter-regional
planning is often seen as a task of national authorities or international commu-
nities, such as the European Union (Cappelin, 1993). Intra-regional planning is
linked with a regional authority, be it a formal regional government or a coali-
tion of local governments and/or other stakeholders.
The modern view of planning coincides with the proliferation of the word
' governance' in recent years. Although this term has slightly different mean-
ings in different disciplines, such as management science and political science,
and also in USA and Europe (Lefevre, 1998), the commonality can be best de-
scribed as the management of the common affairs of political communities by
active collaboration of various interests. The most important characteristic of
governance is that it involves more than government. It explicitly includes other
stakeholders who together attempt to determine the progress of developments in
a region.
This purpose of this paper is to discuss some implications of regional gov-
ernance for regional planning. It is started with a systems view at the relation
between governance and government. In addition the relationship between gov-
ernance and network theory is outlined. Next the obvious association between
collaborative planning and governance will be discussed. Although some
authors defend governance without government (Rhodes, 1996), it will be ex-
plained that so-called 'social dilemmas' exist that cannot be solved without a
superimposed authority, or government. It is illustrated by Dutch regional
transportation practice that regional governance may need an external stimulus
to survive. It will be concluded, that modern regional governance may imply a
shift from traditional comprehensive governmental planning to more 'tailor-
made' planning approaches, such as the formulation of agreement packages
(covenants) between stakeholders.
From government to governance: a periodic swing?
There is little question that societies are becoming increasingly complex. Some
planners therefore argue that complexity should be a touchstone for the plan-
ning approach to be followed (De Roo, 1999). Systems theory (Linstone, 1996)
and also history (Kuhn, 1969; Kennedy, 1989) teach us that the evolution of
complex systems generally appears to proceed by periodic swings between
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opposite system characteristics. For example, a hierarchical system grows until
it can no longer be effectively managed or controlled centrally. The next stage
is that it disintegrates into smaller units with considerable autonomy. Ulti-
mately this disintegration goes too far and the system is no longer effective.
Then a reunification process starts, which brings the system usually at a higher
level of complexity than existed previously; and so on.
Modis (1994) describes this evolutionary pattern of alternating system states
as phases of growth and stagnation, or 'order' and 'disorder'. Order means
growth through development of system components in an internally compatible
way with overall stability, which implies that the technology or organisation is
successful. This is followed by a phase of disorder: growth stagnates, resulting
in instability. In this phase, new technological and organisational options are
explored. This is followed by a stage where new organisational and technologi-
cal concepts provide a new order and a stable growth; and so on.
Linstone and Mitroff (1994) also observed that complex system evolution
generally appears to proceed by periodic swings between centralization and
decentralization. They depict systems growth as alternating processes of growth
and stagnation, of order and chaos. They illustrate that there is much empirical
evidence that societal systems behave in this way. Changing information, com-
munication and transportation technologies have in the past lead to profound
changes in organisations, their geographical behaviour and also their manage-
ment (Kennedy, 1989).
The change from government towards governance may also be explained in
these terms. A metaphor to gain insight into this change is given in Figure 1.
This metaphor is an iterative cyclic process of order and disorder of our com-
plex societal system, but depicted here in two dimensions resulting in four dif-
ferent alternating stages. In stage I the system is in growing disorder and it en-
deavours to find a new order by integration and combination of existing ele-
ments and procedures. In stage II a new order is optimised by central co-
ordination and control mechanisms what we may denote as 'government'.
When there is too much co-ordination and control, the system loses its effec-
tiveness and stage. III is entered. This means a new period of growing disorder,
in which government loses (most of) its grip and disintegrates, until finally in
stage IV a new order is crystallizing out based on differentiation and separation.
The emphasis of this new order is evidently on 'governance' and not 'govern-
ment'.
According to the metaphor of Figure 1 periodic restructuring of a societal
system will in general result in a higher level of complexity than existed previ-
ously. Periodic restructuring of society in general increases system complexity.
This may explain why certain planning tools worked quite satisfactory 30-40
years ago, but are unable to solve today's problems. Evidently, planning meth-
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in the Enlarging European Union. Pécs, Centre for Regional Studies, 2001. 194-213. p.
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odology of a centralized system cannot cope with planning problems of decen-
tralized systems and vice versa.
Figure 1
Phases of societal system evolution
Decentralized System
Emphasis on Governance
GROWING
GROWING
ORDER
DISORDER
IV.
Integration
Differentiation
GROWING
GROWING
DISORDER
ORDER
Emphasis on Government
Centralized System
Source: Own construction.
An intriguing question is in which stage our society currently is. Albeit diffi-
cult to answer, intuition suggests that many countries in Central and Eastern
Europe may now be situated in stage III given the collapse of the centralized
socialist government system. Western Europe may be depicted in stage IV,
given the growing interest in many fields for governance rather than govern-
ment, as mentioned before. It is more difficult to position the United States.
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H. Voogd
This society is witnessing a very strong market-oriented local democracy and
its planning practice seems a decade ahead' on Europe in many respects, at
least given its earlier attention for consensus building, mediation practice, pub-
lic-private partnerships, project-oriented planning, and so on. This could imply
that they have reached again stage I.
But how valid is the metaphor of Figure 1? Can the evolution of a complex
system be so simple as it is suggested here? Or does this metaphor only repre-
sent the past, and will the future be less predictive? Evidently, in recent years
we can see in many societal activities simultaneous opposite developments,
such as localization and globalisation, and decentralization and centralization as
well as differentiation and integration (Partidcirio—Voogd, 1997). New infor-
mation, communication and manufacturing technologies that were inconceiv-
able a few decades ago have made long established and unquestioned functions,
skills and boundaries obsolete. Also, geographical boundaries are for many
activities hardly or no barriers anymore. But in contrast to the decreasing im-
portance of boundaries, we see the resurgence of regionalism both in Europe
and the United States. The region is becoming an increasingly important point
of reference in the face of globalisation and the changing socio-economic im-
portance of the national-state (Horvcith, 1994). Evidently, we can now see
forces at work pulling in opposite directions simultaneously. As Wannop
(1995) also has illustrated, there are many different socio-political and histori-
cal contexts in which regional planning nowadays takes place. This again con-
firms the complexity of regional governance systems modern regional planning
has to cope with.
Regional governance and the network paradigm
Understanding regional governance involves both grasping the functioning of
relevant regional and local institutions, the changing role of government and the
operation of 'networks', both public and private, which attempt to co-ordinate
policy areas. If regional governance is defined as the patterns that emerge from
the policy-making activities of political, administrative and societal actors on a
regional level, the use of a 'network' metaphor is obvious. According to Kenis
and Schneider (1991, 25) the term 'network' has become 'the new paradigm for
the architecture of complexity'.
The network paradigm has gained recognition in social, political and eco-
nomic sciences as the theoretical basis for examining governance structures. A
social network may include as 'nodes' a wide variety of actors: people, firms
I Obviously, in view of Figure 1 'ahead' does not necessarily mean 'better' !
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and other institutions. Between these 'nodes' different relationships can be
distinguished. In network theory links, connections and interactions are seen
especially essential. A network invites different kind of analysis. A rough dis-
tinction can be made between applications that focus on a quantitative, more
formal, treatment of network structures (Wasserman—Faust, 1994; Wasserman-
Galaskiewicz, 1994), and a more qualitative approach focusing on an under-
standing of the dynamics of policy-making processes (Scharpf 1973; Rhodes,
1990; Teisman, 1992; Klijn et al. 1995, Klein, 1996). Especially the latter ap-
proach appears to be useful for understanding the mechanisms, possibilities and
limitations of regional planning (Kasim, 1994, Elander, 1995).
A regional social network is becoming a regional planning network if it is
used for selectively involving and activating certain actors. Such a planning
network can be typified by the following components (Hufen—Ringeling, 1990):
—A set of actors (individuals, groups, institutions);
—The interests, wishes and goals of these actors;
—The activities and problem fields, with regard to the actors have interests
and/or goals;
—The rules, norms and assumptions that determine the actions of, and in-
teractions between the actors;
—The set of action and interaction possibilities of each actor;
—The set of expected outcomes, costs and benefits of each action and inter-
action.
The interactions in a regional planning network are varied in nature (Mar-
tins, 1986). It can involve resources transfer that is the exchange and/or ap-
propriation of resources between actors. Another type of interactions is called
volatile communications (Scharpf 1978). These include offers, demands, com-
mands and their acceptance. Some interactions can be explained in terms of
organisational mobilisation of bias. By this it is meant that administrative rou-
tines tend consistently to favour certain actors at the expense of others. This
can bear the danger that it operates not only in terms of favouring certain actors
to the detriment of others, but also in terms of concentrating attention on certain
problems and solutions to the detriment of others (Martins, 1986).
Planning networks are seldomly stable. Dependent on the problem, each
time new partners and new linkages are created and old linkages are weakened.
For instance, investors have to be interested and attracted, which involves a
different pattern of relationships then after the investment has occurred. Hence,
a network is dynamic. Unlike classical regional development theories which
share a state-centric conception based on a regional, national or supranational
authority for hierarchical co-ordination in public policy-making, planning net-
works may even be used to conceptualise and operationalise the form of 'goy-
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ernance without government' (Rosenau, 1992). This form may be effective if a
network has sufficient self-regulating power (Krawinkel, 1997).
Regional planning involves the recognition and management of a network
structure that can be roughly visualized like. It will help planners to realize that
not the government but other actors may have the decisive power to induce
desired changes. It is therefore essential for a regional planning authority to
know who the major actors are and how they are interrelated both in terms of
goals and in terms of means, including restrictive conditions. This enables a
planning authority to initiate or stimulate effective bargaining or mediation
processes (Healey, 1997).
However, regional governance not necessarily implies the involvement of a
planning authority. It is not expected that all public decisions be prepared by
planning. If theorists of governance, such as Rhodes (1996), be right we must
expect for the coming years both more social fragmentation and attempts by
central authorities to retain control, as well as the emergence of new inter-or-
ganisational networks striving to overcome problems of service delivery and
co-ordination. Networks may emerge that are essentially 'non-geographical',
i.e. not limited to a certain area or region, in which different actors involved in
formulation and implementation of policy co-ordinate their interests through
so-called 'non-hierarchical bargaining' (McAleavey, 1993; Bressers et al. 1994;
Schneider—Dang-Nguyen—Werle, 1994). Networks that are active on a regional
level will most probably include public and private partners, therefore fitting a
general trend towards 'greater permeability of public and private-sector
boundaries' (Stoker, 1996).
Regional governance and collaborative planning
Governance implies co-operation of stakeholders. Patsy Healey (1987) has
developed a collaborative planning approach to the design of governance sys-
tems and practices, focusing on ways of fostering communicative, consensus-
building practices. In her book, she addresses governance processes and the
challenge of institutional design for collaborative planning. Healey distin-
guishes two levels, the 'soft infrastructure' of practices for developing and
maintaining particular strategies in specific places and the 'hard infrastructure'
of the rules and resource of policy systems.
The 'soft infrastructure' rests on communicative action theory (Innes, 1995).
Point of departure of this theory is the assumption that reality is socially con-
structed rather than that 'facts' can be known. Its epistemology is based on
multiple forms of understanding that should be investigated through discourses.
Communicative planning may take many forms of which communication, per-
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suasion, learning, mediation, negotiation and bargaining are essential ingredi-
ents (Forester, 1989; Susskind—Cruikshank, 1987).
No doubt, effective communication is crucial for good governance. Evi-
dently, information distribution alone does not qualify as communicating with
the public, for it is merely a one-way flow. Communication involves two-way
relations whereby both sides can share the facts and voice views. In this light,
extra steps must be taken in order to create venues for allowing stakeholders to
communicate. Friedmann (1973) already pointed out that (transactive) planning
deals with much dialogue, mutual discovery, acceptance of conflict, shared
interests and commitment, and reciprocity and mutual obligation.
It is obvious that participation of a variety of stakeholders is essential to
learn about community values and problems, and for avoiding unnecessary
conflicts by making community members feel comfortable with the way the
process is conducted 2. In the previous section it has been mentioned that plan-
ning networks should encourage civic engagement of stakeholders. These net-
works help to facilitate co-ordination and communication, while amplifying
information about the trustworthiness of other actors. However, there is some
evidence that networks will be less intense and declining in larger communities,
such as regions. For instance, in his research on the decline of social capital,
Putnam (1995) discovered that networks in larger communities are less bal-
anced 'centres of discourse' than they are in small communities. This may be a
weakness of regional governance (for a more elaborate discussion of commu-
nicative/collaborative planning: see Voogd—Woltjer, 1999).
Regional governance and social dilemmas
A fundamental problem of collaborative planning, and hence of governance, is
the existence of so-called social dilemmas (Voogd, 1995, 1999a). A social di-
lemma is a conflict between the choice an actor would make to maximize its
self-interest and the choice that would be best for the collective. In planning we
are often confronted with situations in which private interests are at odds with
public interests. A classical example is Hardin's 'Tragedy of the Commons'
2 The term 'community' is not unambiguous. Traditionally, the term refers to a set of people
living in the same locality in which at least some resources are shared. Yet today, communities
can range geographically from neighbourhoods to small rural hamlets to regional or even global
scales. The term also connotes other definitions of an abstract nature in which physical bounda-
ries are no longer implied (e.g. the Internet community'). In our mobile societies, it is possible to
share resources with many different people in different places and thus be a member of many
communities. 'Community', therefore, has become a loose concept; it is no longer a self-con-
tained entity which can be easily defined.
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(Hardin, 1968). He describes how individual farmers have access to grazing
grounds that are held in common by all. Each can make a personal profit by
adding successive cattle to the commons and each continues to do so. Adding
an extra animal implies costs in terms of pasture consumed, but these costs are
consumed by the collectivity. A tragedy comes into being because every farmer
is inclined to increase his own herd, while leaving the costs involved to the
collectivity. But, as this process continues, as a result far greater costs are likely
to be generated than individually absorbed benefits. Ultimately the commons
will be destroyed. This is an example of a group of individuals who are faced
with the problem of how to maintain their collective good and who — if they
give in to their individual 'greed' — actually produce a collective undesired
product.
In order to prevent such an undesired collective situation, individuals have
to restraint themselves. This is not an easy affair. Any individual in the above
situation may consider two possibilities. First, if others do exercise restraint,
one can personally enjoy the fruits of their restraint without having to contrib-
ute to its costs. That is, by being a so-called 'free-rider', one profits from the
fact that others prevent the collective bad situation. Second, one may consider
the possibility of being a 'sucker' who incurs a cost when nobody else does,
perhaps ending up carrying the total cost. But why should one do this?
The implications of this behaviour can have far reaching effects for all as-
pects of life. Jay Forrester researched this phenomenon in the 1970s. His fa-
mous study of 'system dynamics' led him to believe that some of the causes of
pressing public issues are grounded in the very politics to solve them. These
policies are too often the result of superficiality and social acceptability, which
devise interventions that focus on obvious symptoms, not the underlying
causes. The problem is that this produces short-term benefit, with little or no
improvement in the long run. Forrester (1971) illustrated that when more
symptomatic interventions are needed and used, a cycle begins with detrimental
consequences.
Different types of social dilemmas can be distinguished, for instance based
on the number of people in the group, the nature of contributions (continuous or
once-only), the nature of rewards or utility (proportional or step), jointness of
supply, and so on (Axelrod, 1984). An interesting distinction of social dilem-
mas from a planning point of view relates to the quality of the initial collective
situation, viz. the maintenance of a public good and the provision of a public
good, respectively. The social dilemma of Hardin's metaphor refers to dilem-
mas in which the initial situation is desirable from a collective point of view.
But it asks for costly individual actions to keep it desirable, in other words, to
maintain the current situation. Examples are all around us: the protection of our
cultural heritage, nature areas, historic town centres, and so forth. But we can
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also distinguish situations where the initial situation is an undesirable one:
derelict land, heavily polluted areas, areas with urban blight, etc. This demands
costly individual actions to make the situation desirable from a collective point
of view.
Research from social psychologists, however, revealed no fundamental dif-
ference between the behaviour of actors in 'take some games', directed towards
maintenance of a public good, and 'give some games', focussing on the provi-
sion of a public good (Rutte et al. 1987). This suggests that in both perspectives
actors be inclined to burden others with the costs of the maintenance or the
provision of collective goods.
Social dilemmas are products of rational thinking. Rational thinking means
that a utility framework is used for analysing and understanding actors and
processes. According to such framework an action is rational if it has the high-
est utility of all options recognised. Here it is assumed that a utility framework
does not necessarily require that the information available is correct and ex-
haustive. If an action is based on a utility assessment of erroneous information,
it still remains a rational action. Evidently, social dilemmas can be easily theo-
retically 'removed' by rejecting this interpretation of rationality. But if it is
accepted that actors do not behave rationally, why should we embrace govern-
ance based on collaborative planning? Why should 'irrational' behaving actors
accept a governance system, which is also intrinsically based on a utility (`win-
win') framework?
Hardin (1968) expressed the belief that social dilemmas can only be solved
by some kind of mutual restraint and that solutions which do appeal to individ-
ual co-operation are doomed to be unsuccessful. Research of social psycholo-
gists into this matter did show that in general an actor has a strong reluctance to
hand over one's decisional freedom to a superimposed authority (Wilke et al.
1986; Rutte et al. 1987). This reluctance can be overcome, however, when one
is sufficiently compensated. A certain loss of control is accepted when faced
with a situation in which there is a thread of a collective catastrophe or when
there are large social discrepancies in the allocation of outcomes. These results,
derived from psychological gaming, suggest that the framing of a situation as
one in which large inequalities or an impending catastrophe is at stake, will
make decision-making by a superimposed authority acceptable.
Given these opinions and research results, it would be a logical next step to
proclaim government as a superimposed authority that should solve social di-
lemmas. However, this is less obvious as it may seem. It depends on the quality
of government whether they are willing and able to recognise social dilemmas
and whether they want to act accordingly. This recognition of social dilemmas
by the government is very important, especially if we acknowledge the results
of psychological research that in case of social dilemmas voluntary co-opera-
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tion alone does not work (Rutte et al. 1987). For example, we know that there is
little chance of successful environmental voluntary action by citizens due to the
social dilemma phenomenon. Environmental planning can never be successful
without a government enforcing rules and constraints. Heritage planning would
be a failure if it would only depend on voluntary sacrifices; the provision and
preservation of a broad spectrum of culture cannot carry on without the support
of government. Health care facilities, high quality public transport, etc. would
never reach the thinly populated periphery of a country without national and
regional government support, and so forth. 'Here' will always be more impor-
tant than 'there', and 'now' more important that 'then', if the masses have to
decide (Vlek—Keren, 1992). These observations support the conclusion that the
importance of the role of government, being the most important actor for solv-
ing social dilemmas, must not be neglected in regional governance.
Regional governance and government
There is no question that for ethical, political and 'marketing' reasons 'bottom-
up' regional governance, as reflected in participatory, communicative, collabo-
rative, etc. planning, are much to be preferred to 'top-down' government.
However, as outlined in the previous section, certain social dilemmas call for
`top-down' government. This problem is usually dealt with by introducing the
subsidiarity principle, which means that the decision-making authority should
reside at the level most appropriate to the problem being addressed. 3 Unfortu-
nately, this is not an unambiguous criterion, as discussions in and about the
European Union clearly illustrate (CEC, 1992; Toulemonde, 1996; Merkel—
Heinz, 1997).
With respect to the role of the superimposed authority, three elements
should be distinguished. The first element concerns the level at which authority
should be vested for specific policy areas. Which tasks should be delegated to a
regional government or regional co-operative? This relates to the well-known
debate over centralization and decentralization (Eichenberger, 1994). Decen-
tralization can allow government to respond more effectively to variations in
local needs and preferences; to lower costs of planning and administration;
provide opportunities and incentives for policy innovation; and give citizens
greater choice and voice in policymaking. Centralization, on the other hand,
3 In the Treaty on the European Union, Article 3b, it is described as: "In areas which are not
under its exclusive power, the Community shall act in conformity with the principle of subsidiar-
ity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved
by the member states and can therefore, by reason of the scale and efforts of the proposed action
be better achieved by the Community".
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enables government to address problems having cross-border (or spillover)
effects; protect consumers against product risks; exploit available economies of
scale; co-ordinate policies more effectively; and promote equality and political
homogeneity across a larger domain to reflect 'shared values'. The theoretical
advantages of centralization and decentralization counterbalance each other,
suggesting that the precise nature of an optimal allocation of authority may
prove to be highly context-dependent. The second element regards the question
of how intrusive policy-making of a regional authority should be. Evidently, it
should not render superfluous local policymaking. Clearly, the demands and
needs of local stakeholders must be addressed. The third element addresses the
question of how individual stakeholders can retain some control over a policy
area that is delegated to the regional authority. This calls for dialogues in a
network context.
These dialogues might be most effectively promoted by the rules suggested
by Healey (1997, 297), i.e.:
—By broadly-based rights of voice and influence for concerned people;
—By provisions to ensure that all parties who can demonstrate a stake in an
issue have the opportunity to challenge decisions in superimposed arenas;
—By a right to good quality information available to all parties to assist
them to consider what is a stake;
—By a right available to all parties to call any governance agency, formal or
informal, to account for failure, with respect to the duties and
responsibilities which apply to the exercise of responsibilities of the
superimposed authority.
A Dutch experience: regional transportation governance
Regional governance, especially of urban regions, is often seen as a problem in
the Netherlands. All urban regions in the Netherlands have multiple govern-
mental authorities. For the seven largest urban regions (In Dutch: kaderwet
gebieden) 'umbrella' organisations now exist, that covers the entire regions.
But these organisations are not founded on direct public elections, which means
that their democratic legitimacy is often questioned. Their power is therefore
limited.
Regional public transport may also be subdivided between different institu-
tions. Although a Bus Company has more or less a monopoly in its own spe-
cific work area, a region is often served by more than one Bus Company. Co-
ordination between Bus Companies appears to be not always an easy task, be-
cause there is no formal need to communicate and co-operate. In addition, the
Dutch Railway Company is an important actor. This is an independent privat-
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ized organisation, whose prime interest is not 'how to serve the region best' but
`how to survive without a deficit' (Voogd, 1999b).
In order to improve regional institutional co-ordination, the Dutch govern-
ment introduced in 1988 in her strategic national transport plan, the so-called
Structure Scheme on Traffic and Transportation, a new concept. This concept
was called the Transport Regions (see also Kerstens, 1998). It was advocated
that urban regions should develop a specific regional co-ordinating institution,
including both public and private stakeholders, for realizing an integrated re-
gional traffic and transportation policy. Because of the national funding in-
volved, within a few years time almost 30 Transport Regions were created.
Although the initiative was 'top-down', the resulting process was clearly a vol-
untary 'bottom-up' process. Hence, Transport Regions had different organisa-
tional structures and types of participants. Most often, the following actors
were involved: the municipal authorities, the province, representatives from
national ministry for traffic and transportation, Bus Companies, the Dutch
Railway Company, and the Chamber of Commerce.
Unfortunately, the Transport Regions never became a success (Kerstens,
1998). A very, if not most, important factor was that the national government
did not adequately support her own initiative (Hensing, 1993). At the same time
that the Ministry of Traffic and Transportation introduced the Transport Re-
gion, the Ministry of Interior Affairs worked on a new administrative structure
for the Netherlands, especially directed towards an improvement of the admin-
istrative structure of urban agglomerations. This evoked a lot of discussion. It
soon appeared that only a very few (ultimately seven) Transport Regions were
also nominated for a special administrative regional status, in between a mu-
nicipal and a provincial status. The other Transport Regions felt more of less
abandoned by the Dutch government, which killed this promising initiative.
Without national support, there was no impetus for a voluntary continuation of
this regional governance initiative.
It is interesting to remark here that initially the 'bottom-up' process of cre-
ating Transport Regions was very successful. This raises the question, why
different public and private participants were so eager to co-operate for
realising an integrated regional policy. Unfortunately, the answer is rather
down-to-earth: they expected a financial reward! It was also this reason that a
number of Transport Regions did not function very well, because of internal
conflicts about the division of funds that were not, not yet, or only very limited
available (Hensing, 1993).
Another problem of institutional co-operation appeared to be the different
`cultures' of the actors involved. Governmental officials sometimes complained
that representatives of, for instance, Bus Companies were hardly willing, or
able, to think in more strategic terms than the level of a time-schedule of a bus.
Henk Voogd : Rethinking Regional Governance and Planning. In: Role of the Regions
in the Enlarging European Union. Pécs, Centre for Regional Studies, 2001. 194-213. p.
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This hampered the quality of the debates and the consensus-building process
(Hensing, 1993).
Besides this institutional approach of regional governance, also procedural
solutions have been offered to improve a co-ordinated regional planning. As a
result of the failure of the Transport Regions, the National Government entered
a discussion with representatives of municipalities and provinces about new
procedures for regional transport planning. Special attention was given to the
funding problem, since this was the major issue for municipal and provincial
authorities. It was decided to have a redistribution of some parts of the national
infrastructure fund to provinces and municipalities for improving regional
transport planning and traffic safety. This was justified by pointing at the
subsidiarity principle discussed before. In 1997 a covenant was signed between
the national government, provinces and municipalities about the decentraliza-
tion of national traffic and transport tasks and related funding. In return, it was
agreed upon a further formalization of the transport planning structure in a
sense that regional traffic and transportation plans should be made in order to
guide decision-making and future investments.
How should we judge this development in the light of the governance-gov-
ernment debate? The positive view is that plan making enables public discus-
sion, provided that a pro-active institutional and citizens involvement is stimu-
lated. It offers, however, no guarantee that, for instance, land use and transpor-
tation policies are consistently geared to one another. On the contrary, in prac-
tice it may imply a strengthening of the transport sector and hence a strength-
ening of 'narrow minded' sectorial viewpoints, which may enhance, rather than
narrowing down, the gap between land use and transport planning.
A Dutch experience: covenants
The agreement with respect to the redistribution of national infrastructure funds
illustrates an important procedural development, which is significant for gov-
ernance. This concern the use of covenants, being voluntary agreements based
on a consensus-building process between various actors involved (Voogd,
1999b). In Dutch environmental planning covenants are regarded as an effec-
tive instrument that better reflects the joint responsibility of the government
and industry for environmental improvement (Bertels—Kranendonk, 1996). The
intensive consultation that precedes the signing of covenants, allows the gov-
ernment to obtain a better understanding of the possibilities and barriers to en-
vironmental improvement in industry, and to adapt goals, legislation and sup-
port realistically. These discussions also provide an opportunity to create in-
creased awareness of environmental problems among industry representatives.
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in the Enlarging European Union. Pécs, Centre for Regional Studies, 2001. 194-213. p.
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The use of covenants in environmental planning is not without problems
(Bertels—Kranendonk, 1996). Actors that do not want to join in the negotiations
or withdraw from them, undermine the results and morale of the operation. Bad
public acceptability is another problem. Voluntary agreements have received a
bad image in the press because, since the negotiations between authorities and
industry were held behind closed doors and not controlled by Parliament, the
suspicion arose that government representatives were being lobbied and other-
wise influenced by industrial interests.
Environmental groups, while they see a use for covenants, are showing some
fear that covenants may engender prolonged deterioration of the environment
because companies are using them to slow the process of environmental im-
provement (Bertels—Kranendonk, 1996). They therefore suggest improving the
performance of voluntary agreements by making them one element within a
broader package of instruments, which should also include sanctions and direct
regulation in the case of non-compliance. In other words, what is needed is a
`stick behind the door' (Houtsma, 1994).
Covenants have also been important for the implementation of national
physical planning policy. In the Fourth Report on Physical Planning (1988), and
its renewed version, the Fourth Report on Physical Planning Extra (1992) —
abbreviated in Dutch as Vinex — much attention was paid to locations for new
large-scale neighbourhoods. These locations, called Vinex-locations, have all
been situated within existing urban agglomerations. A main reason was that
such locations would stimulate the use of public transport. However, this also
raised quite a few problems, because most sites were not easy to develop due to
their spatial characteristics (e.g. former wasteland with contaminated soils
and/or close to highways or other infrastructure that causes environmental
problems, such as noise nuisance or safety problems). Additional funding from
national government was necessary to make these locations attractive enough
for public investors and developers. It took several years before agreements
between municipalities and the national government could be written down in
covenants.
Covenants are also important instruments for establishing informal regional
development plans and implementation agreements. A recent example is the
development plan for the urban region of Groningen. This region has a special
governance structure, since it is situated in two provinces (Province of Gronin-
gen in the north and the Province of Drenthe in the south) and it consists of
twelve municipalities. In the past, many voluntary arrangements, among other
along the lines of the "Transport Region" as described above, failed because of
competition struggles and the fact that there were two formal regional authori-
ties involved for different parts of the region, viz. the provincial governments of
Groningen and Drenthe.
Henk Voogd : Rethinking Regional Governance and Planning. In: Role of the Regions
in the Enlarging European Union. Pécs, Centre for Regional Studies, 2001. 194-213. p.
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The voluntary regional plan for the urban region of Groningen is an inte-
grated land-use and transportation plan. It is accompanied by an implementa-
tion covenant, stating the agreements about the organisation of the collabora-
tion and the implementation, including the financial contribution of each part-
ner each year for common projects.
This approach has received both appreciation and critique. The appreciation
refers to the integrated approach of land-use planning, regional economic plan-
ning and transport planning and the fact that the barrier of provincial bounda-
ries is crossed. The critique especially focuses on the democratic process, or
more precise, the lack of public and political involvement in the 're-active'
plan-making process. Municipal councils feel that it is a matter of 'if you don't
like it, you can lump it'. There is hardly any opportunity for council members
to change the covenant, since it is the product of an institutional consensus
building process behind close doors between a few representatives in a 'steer-
ing committee' or alike. On the other hand, many participants will agree that if
it had been 'pro-active' governance, there would not have been any agreement
at all.
Some concluding remarks
This paper has paid attention to governance and its relationship with regional
planning. Regional planning is in most countries unmistakable a public sector-
led activity, but comprising both public and private actors. Since regional plan-
ning does not exist in a social vacuum, it has much in common with modern
ideas about governance. Its outcomes will not only be shaped by discourses and
power relations internal to the planning network (i.e. 'soft infrastructure' ac-
cording to Healey, 1997), but also by a variety of contextual constraints: social,
political, economic, and organisational (i.e. 'hard infrastructure'). These
constraints are themselves, in part at least, the result of wider power relations,
including the increasing role of the European Union.
Regional planning is in essence action-oriented, i.e. it should evoke actions
to improve spatial and environmental qualities of a region, including social and
economic conditions, as well as provide a protective framework to prevent a
deterioration of regional resources. It is argued in this paper that it is unlikely
that regional governance, without the assistance of regional government as a
superimposed authority, can handle all these tasks. 'Tailor-made' planning ap-
proaches will be necessary, each beginning by identifying the set of actors in-
volved in the governance process. Network theory shows that it is necessary not
only to identify which actors are involved, but also to clarify what role each
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in the Enlarging European Union. Pécs, Centre for Regional Studies, 2001. 194-213. p.
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actor can play in the process and how they may interact in the planning net-
work.
Experiences with Dutch regional planning practices show that there should
be an acknowledgement of the important role of superimposed authorities for
planning, both as an arena where representatives must balance their delegated
interests and as an arena were conditions (rules, regulations, plans) are shaped
for dealing with the interests of stakeholders, for instance in the field of
sustainable development, heritage protection, and so forth.
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